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An Investigation into the Systematic Meaning of  
Sensuous-Certainty in Hegel 
 
Timothy Schatz 
The quintessential characterization of  Hegel's philosophy is that of  a circle. In the 
context of  his Phenomenology of  Spirit, this means a kind of  unity or semblance 
thereof  between sensuous-certainty and absolute knowing. In this paper, I 
demonstrate the aforementioned unity through a reading of  the section on sensuous-
certainty, one which is mediated by the work of  Jean Hyppolite and Jay Bernstein. 
Through this approach, I highlight several issues of  metaphysical importance, viz., 
space, time, object, and subject, at the beginning of  Hegel's text, as well as 
delineating an underlying ethical matter of  responsibility vis-à-vis the capacity to 
remember. 
 
I. A Brief  Outline of  the Investigation 
The aim of  this investigation is to answer what it means for sensuous-certainty to be the 
beginning of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit. At the outset of  my investigation, I have two presumed 
conceptions that inform my reading, that of  Jean Hyppolite and Jay Bernstein. This paper will 
thereby take the two conceptions together in order to unify the beginning and end of  the 
Phenomenology. The result is what I term the “spatiotemporal subject-object ensemble,” i.e., the self, 
the object, the now, and the here. The conceptualization of  this representation is the meaning of  absolute 
knowing, which, through investigating, will enable us to understand sensuous-certainty. From the 
vantage point of  the end, for us it stands that sensuous-certainty is essentially a disavowal of  
mediation, which, in the affirmation of  mediation in its sublation,  results in a drawing forth of  the 1
said ensemble and necessarily holding onto it in memory and taking responsibility for this activity. 
II. Initial Considerations: Bernstein and Hyppolite 
Hyppolite’s conception of  sensuous-certainty in his book, Genesis and Structure of  Hegel's 
 1. This term presents a number of  issues in English, made worse by certain translations, and by the fact that 
Phenomenology of  Spirit is essentially a first draft. Though we are no strangers to homonymy, we often are taken aback by 
the idea that the word has three different meanings: lifting up, preserving, and negating. In German, Aufhebung retains 
these three uses. However, as Hegel discusses in his Encyclopedia, he only means two of  these: preserving and negation. 
Hegel’s insight is that negation has a preservative effect, and any inclination of  upward movement is something forced 
onto Hegel by readers. The image of  Hegelian philosophy is said to be a circle, and the sublation of  a contradiction is 
realizing the limits of  that circle within a sphere. The movement is therefore not about subsuming everything but in 
unifying the world in its differences, from organically moving through thought determinations in an enriching process. 
The key to this paper here is in this fact, i.e., that we do not leave things behind but realize how they stay with us (i.e., are 
preserved) and return in new contexts. 
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Phenomenology of  Spirit, is twofold. First, he presents it in regard to absolute knowing and, in the 
second, to the prior sections in the Philosophy of  Spirit. In regard to the first he says: “If  we are to 
grasp the whole of  Hegel’s thought, we must understand this starting point of  his philosophy: the 
intuition of  life or of  the I which develops by opposing itself  and rediscovering itself.”  He 2
continues, “Hegel shows how consciousness begins with equality that will later be its end, the goal 
that it will strive to reach, to reconquer reflectively … In the first chapter, truth and certainty are 
immediately equal; in the last chapter certainty, i.e., subjectivity, has posed itself  in being, posed itself  
as truth, and truth, i.e., objectivity, has shown itself  to be certainty, self-consciousness.”  Hyppolite 3
locates the notion of  this unity of  truth and certainty as a result of  the sublation of  the sensuous 
soul of  anthropology.  This sublation represents a “moment of  separation” between the subject and 4
object.  Hyppolite thereby presents his conception of  sensuous-certainty as the break with the non-5
distinguishing perspective of  the sensuous soul: “The soul no longer senses but is consciousness: it 




Bernstein’s conception proves fruitful in combination with Hyppolite’s, i.e., in relation to the 
break with the sensuous soul. Bernstein, in his published audio lectures, says: 
So rather than think of  immediacy as immediate—that’s the wrong view—I’m 
suggesting that immediacy is itself  an expression of  a desire to escape from 
conditionedness, mediation. It wants to escape from the burden that we have to tell 
the difference between true and false. And that, indeed, in knowledge we are 
responsible in some way for truth-telling and, therefore, distinguishing truth from 
false.  7
Such a position expresses Hegel’s overarching suspicion of  forms of  immediate knowing. In his 
Encyclopedia, Hegel notes the need to overcome immediate knowing in order to engage in science.  8
Further, Hegel adds in the preface of  his Phenomenology that immediate knowing is devoid of  spirit, 
2. Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), 81.
3. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 81-82.
 4. The third volume of  Hegel's Encyclopedia concerns spirit and in many ways re-systematizes his Phenomenology 
of  Spirit. Hyppolite’s reading thereby situates itself  in the context of  the later system.
  5. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 84.
  6. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 84.
  7. Jay M. Bernstein, “Phenomenology of  Spirit Lectures 1 to 30,” Lecture 1, Part 1, 06:59-07:41, https://
bernsteintapes.com/hegellist.html.
   8. G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of  the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of  Logic, 
trans. and eds. Klaus Brinkmann, and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015), §78. Hereafter cited as EL.
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which is called sensuous consciousness.  It appears that the younger Hegel held the opposite view, 9
but, as Brady Bowman discusses, he later turned against the idea of  a rich, non-discursive, 
knowing.  Bernstein's reading thereby expresses Hegel’s rejection of  content-rich, sensuous 10
knowing. 
III. Systematic Considerations of  Beginning and Sensuous-Certainty 
 “The beginning,” Hegel writes in The Science of  Logic, “must then be absolute or, what means 
the same here, must be an abstract beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose, must not 
be mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself  the ground of  the entire 
science.”  The mediate will return, as Hegel says “there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or 11
anywhere else that does not contain just as much immediacy as mediation.”  Beginning with the 12
immediate, being as such or pure being, thereby engenders the organic development of  the system 
and so overcomes the dogmatic metaphysics of  the past. Sensuous being is recuperated as an 
expression of  absolute essence, and sensuous consciousness (i.e., spirit) is an abstraction of  this; that 
is, it is one-sided.  Thus, the beginning is not irrelevant; a point which Hegel makes more generally 13
in his Logic: “The beginning of  philosophy is the ever-present and self-preserving foundation of  all 
subsequent developments, remaining everywhere immanent in its further determinations.”  If  we 14
are to investigate sensuous-certainty, then an analysis will be twofold, i.e., have both a moment of  
mediated and immediate sense. 
The two initial conceptions provided by Hyppolite and Bernstein can be understood as the 
expression of  this twofold nature. On the one hand, Hyppolite would have us ultimately mediate the 
meaning through absolute knowing and, in part, the sensuous soul; on the other hand, Bernstein 
takes sensuous-certainty primarily in its immediate context. We thereby need to look back from the 
end, and so the question takes on a final determination: what is the meaning of  sensuous-certainty as 
disavowal of  the mediate? Hegel characterizes it generally: “immediate knowing has the truth for its 
content only taken in isolation, to the exclusion of  mediation.”  Structurally, it would deny limits, and 15
in this way appears as a parody of  the true infinity of  thinking in the manner of  there being nothing 
  9. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. Terry P.  Pinkard, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), §27. Hereafter cited as PS.
  10. Brady Bowman, “Spinozist Pantheism and the Truth of  ‘Sense Certainty’: What the Eleusinian Mysteries 
Tell Us about Hegel's Phenomenology.” Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 1 (January 2012): 85–110, https://
doi.org/10.1353/hph.2012.0019.
 11. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of  Logic, trans. and ed. George di Giovanni, 48. Hereafter cited as SL.
 12. SL 46.
 13. PS ¶760.
  14. SL 49.
 15. EL §65.
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outside of  thought in such a way that there is an identity of  being and thought. That is, in 
Hyppolite’s view, summarized by Judith Butler in her book on French Hegelianism, “[T]o think the 
absolute is to engage both a knowledge of  temporality and a temporal experience of  this truth; in 
effect, the truth of  time must be suffered to be known.”  Sensuous-certainty denies the need for 16
this suffering in the labor of  knowing. Yet, since it is overcome (sublated), immediate knowing is 
preserved and refigured as posited by later shapes. With a view to where we are going, a richer 
systematic meaning can be grasped, namely, that sensuous-certainty prepares the setting that is to 
become the midden heap of  history to be reconciled. Since this beginning undergirds the whole 
development, what it does as a shape of  cognition or consciousness needs to be articulated, and, in 
order to do so, the whole movement of  immediate knowing must be grasped. 
IV. Analysis of  Sensuous-Certainty as a Single Movement 
 In the first act, sensuous-certainty has already divided the world into the mediate and 
immediate, but, beyond the mere division, it disavows the mediate pole and thinks immediacy as 
self-sufficient, i.e., without the need for mediation.  When we go to test consciousness, we ask it a 17
question, we write down the answer, and our answer proves to be untrue, e.g., the now is the night, in 
the middle of  the day … What has happened to our truth? The now became mediated: “This self-
maintaining Now is thus not an immediate Now but a mediated Now, for it is determined as an 
enduring and self- maintaining Now as a result of  another not existing, namely, the day or the night.”  18
The contradiction is expressed by the two propositions: now is the night and now is the day. From the 
outside, we can see that it is not the mediation that produces a contradiction, but a disavowal of  
mediation that produces the contradiction by which two contrary predicates emerged out of  the 
subject. The immediate fails to mean a single thing, and so it turns out that “[immediacy] is indifferent 
to what is in play alongside it.”  In short, it means nothing at all. This also occurs with this as here. 19
 The result is that objective, sensuous intuition is universal, yet some, namely Feuerbach, say 
that only what we did is universal. Robert Solomon summarizes the critique by Feuerbach: “what 
Hegel is fallaciously doing here is attacking a certain claim about the word ‘this’ (and others like it) 
 16. Judith Butler, Subjects of  Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2012), 83-84.
  17. The dialectic of  sensuous-certainty, while a single movement, is divided into three moments, which I call the 
first act, second act, and the third act. Each is not a proper sublation but propels the development in exposing different 
sides of  the contradiction. 
 18. PS ¶96.
 19. PS ¶96.
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instead of  making the point he thinks he is making about the nature of  experience.”  He comes to 20
argue that Hegel’s critique falls flat because there is a contradiction between word (universal) and 
world (particular); however, I think that Robert B. Pippin provides a good response to the issue 
when he says, “The reference to language, in other words, plays an explanatory, not a justificatory, 
role.”  Our questions and answers are grounded in sensuous-certainty experience, i.e., it is not alien 21
to it in meaning. For, as Hegel maintained, “The dialectic which it has in itself  will take on a form as 
intelligible as the ‘This’ itself.”  Further, “we need only to consider [how the object] as sensuous-22
certainty has in it sensuous-certainty itself.”  We are speaking on the behalf  of  consciousness, and 23
so the university of  sensibility is not an alien imposition. 
 Regarding the universality of  the sensuous, Hegel says, “We thereby of  course do not represent 
to ourselves the universal This or being as such, but we express the universal; or, in this sensuous 
certainty we do not at all say what we mean.”  Neither we nor consciousness present “being as such” 24
to ourselves, for it is not that we are taking existence and reflecting on it. What is at stake here is the 
question of  what is given, or, as W. Clark Wolf  puts it, taken in experience.  This is so that nothing 25
besides pure being is taken in immediacy, no matter how much content one would posit as in 
sensuous being. The reason for needing to speak is best expressed by Hyppolite in his book Logic and 
Existence, where he writes that “the sensible … turns into sense by negating itself  as sensible.”  26
Further, Bernstein notes that our methodology is more complex than sensuous-certainty, in the 
sense that it is not yet capable of  engaging in sense-making proper.  Taken in conjunction with 27
Hyppolite, this analysis must be narrated in language for us and consciousness must develop further 
before it can understand its development during this shape, thereby neutralizing a Feuerbachian 
critique. 
 There is, however, a later moment in the dialectic of  sensuous-certainty where a redoubled 
Feuerbachian critique could be made. In the third act, it is said that “we step up to [the Now] and let 
ourselves point.”  Our activity would seem to be essentially different than before, for we are taking 28
 20. Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of  Hegel: A Study of  G.W.F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 68.
 21. Robert B. Pippin, Hegel's Idealism the Satisfactions of  Self-Consciousness, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 119.
 22. PS ¶95.
 23. PS ¶94.
 24. PS ¶97.
 25. W. Clark Wolf, “The Myth of  the Taken: Why Hegel Is Not a Conceptualist,” International Journal of  
Philosophical Studies, vol. 27, no. 3 (2019): 399–421. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2019.1612617.
  26. Jean Hyppolite, Logic and Existence, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 32.
  27. Bernstein, Lecture 1, Part 1, 22:48-23:52.
  28. PS ¶105.
Ex Animo 53 Vol. 1
an active role. Hegel is narrating the experience of  sensuous-certainty, but not in the sense of  giving 
an empirical account of  a sensuous consciousness. Sensuous-certainty is experiencing mediation, 
even if  it would deny this if  it could be asked, and all that our pointing does is show that mediation 
is necessarily present. Like Socrates, we guide the student to the limits and contradictions present in 
what is already there. In this instruction, we are not inflicting anything alien but, in a way, recollecting 
or bringing attention to the mediation of  immediacy that is already constitutive of  the experience. 
Herein lies the similarity between Hegel’s original question and answer (what is the now) and later 
act of  pointing. Yet before we point, we and consciousness are not bound in the experience together; 
this occurs when we point, which will not occur until the third act. 
 The second act, though brief, sees mediation rise in the immediate I.  Hegel says, “Its truth is 29
in the object as my object, or, in what I mean; the object is because I know it.”  Bernstein remarks 30
that the I was there all along, which would reveal for us that the cognition of  the object was the 
result of  the reception on the part of  the subject.  In this way, I know the objects “because I hold 31
fast to them.”  Yet, “sensuous-certainty experiences in these relationships the same dialectic as it did 32
within the preceding relationships.”  It thereby transpires that the I is also universal, i.e., objective 33
sensuous-immediacy is not relegated to any subset, but it also occurs that receptivity is universal. 
 In the third act, “we thereby come to posit the whole of  sensuous-certainty itself  as its essence 
and no longer only as a moment of  sensuous-certainty, as happened in both cases, in which at first 
the object opposed to the I and then the I itself  were each supposed to be the reality of  sensuous-
certainty.”  The whole of  sensuous-certainty, i.e., the sum of  the two parts, the I and object, is now 34
the essence, i.e., it is no longer a container of  an essential and inessential moment. This result 
grounds Hegel’s earlier remark that “an actual sensuous-certainty is not only this pure immediacy but 
also an example of  it.”  This example of  mediation in immediacy is not of  the prior “this and not 35
this” but the object and I with “this and not this.”  In the third act, therefore, instead of  raising up 
either the self  or object, both are taken up as the two co-moments of  the immediate. Yet it still is 
caught up immediately with itself, i.e., the not here and not now, and so it “clings tenaciously in such 
 29. It is worth stressing the importance of  this act, for, in the history of  modern philosophy, the self  is given a 
presence to itself, which Hegel begins to unmoor. Among the highest developments of  this idea is that of  Freud’s ego, 
but we should see here (with hints of  Kant’s transcendental illusion) the capacity for a lack of  immediate transparency.
 30. PS ¶100.
 31. Bernstein, Lecture 1, Part 1, 44:00-:46:32.
 32. PS ¶101.
 33. PS ¶101.
 34. PS ¶103.
 35. PS ¶ 92.
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sensuous-certainty to immediacy.”  Sensuous-certainty thereby takes on the form of  sleep, for 36
sensuous-certainty “no longer wishes to step forward;” it has gone limp, succumbs to a torpid 
state.  It attempts to return to sleep, to know only the infinite dream, for it has seen that to be 37
awake is to see death. This state is, however, untenable, and now we are to point while immersed in the 
experience in order to demonstrate this. 
 With us immersed in the shape of  consciousness, our thoughtless pointing enables Hegel to 
announce, “The Now is pointed out, this Now. Now: It has already ceased to be as it was pointed out; 
the ‘Now that is’ is an other than that pointed out, and we see that the Now is just this Now as it no 
longer is.”  On what has occurred, Hegel narrates: 38
(1) I point out the Now, and it is asserted to be the true. However, I point to it as 
something that has been and thus sublate the first truth, and (2) I assert the 
Now as the second truth, that it has been, that it is sublated. (3) However, what 
has been is not; I sublate that second truth, that it has been, or, its having-been-
sublated, and, in doing that, I negate the negation of  the Now and so turn 
back to the first assertion, namely, that Now is.  39
 
This movement, as Hegel says, is the “negation of  the negation.”  Yet this negation of  the negation 40
is not a reversal of  act one and two; rather this negation of  the negation is sublation. Sublation is 
negative, but that something is negated into its opposite brings with it that movement so that the 
negated returns, negating its negation. The pointing reveals the mutual implication, for it shows that 
one thing came from another and, since its result is its result, the result posits the negated original. 
However, there remains a gap in this analysis: why is the now I point to a has-been? Hyppolite leads 
us to consult the dialectic of  being in The Science of  Logic for an answer. In The Science of  Logic, Hegel 
writes, “[being] is pure indeterminateness and emptiness … it is only this pure empty intuiting 
itself.”  Being, or this, passed over into nothing, or not this, because it was empty, i.e., immediate 41
meaning really means nothing. Yet, Hegel says, “Nothing is therefore the same determination or 
rather absence of  determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is.”  Being and 42
nothing are opposites, and so stand opposed to each other, yet the line that is supposed to separate 
the two does not keep them apart. 
Being and nothing passed over into each other, for being is empty and nothing is realized to 
 36. PS ¶ 106.
 37. PS ¶ 107.
 38. PS ¶ 106.
 39. PS ¶107.
 40. SL 59.
 41. PS ¶108.
 42. SL 59.
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be the same as being. Being = nothing, and yet are not the same; however, this is only made stable 
through positing being and nothing as moments of  becoming as a “quiescent simplicity.”  43
Sensuous-certainty will produce a similar outcome: 1) the now passed away and so is not now, 2) it is 
not now, i.e., it is not now, and 3) that now is not now is that now has been shown to equal not now, 
i.e., it is now. This is all to say that the not now is just as much as the now, or the now and the not 
now are not different, just as being and nothing. This occurs because of  the emptiness of  the now, 
and it passes away. The equality of  the now and not now is the reason for the emptiness of  any 
intending on the part of  consciousness. This also happens with the Here, that not here = here, but 
with the chirality of  three dimensions.  The this and not this co-imply each other, and so every 44
moment of  time or space is a sublation, in the manner that implication posits co-implication.  In 45
regard to the shape of  immediate knowing, what this means is that immediacy and mediation are 
essentially united. This unity is the universal ensemble of  hours and minutes as continuous time and 
also as the continuous space of  the self  knowing the objective. Therefore, at this point, sensuous-
certainty has been overcome, for the immediacy involves mediation. Perceptive consciousness, 
therefore, has supplanted sensuous-certainty by gathering and binding together the here, the now, 
the self, and the object, as a universal, spatiotemporal subject-object ensemble. 
V. Absolute Knowing and Sensuous-Certainty 
I asserted earlier that the sublation of  sensuous-certainty prepared the space for the 
unfolding of  the shapes of  consciousness, which coalesces as the midden heap of  history. From the 
standpoint of  the end of  the narration of  the dialectic of  sensuous-certainty, the next shape is 
perception, and the development continues all the way to absolute knowing. In a one-sided sense, 
since it was the beginning, it is merely the prior shape to other shapes. Yet, insofar as it undergirds 
the development, it ought be explicated from the end—from absolute knowing—and we should 
look back beyond a mere invocation of  the explicit references to it. This richer sense can be initially 
grasped as the unity of  the spatiotemporal subject-object ensemble, memory, and responsibility. Our 
venture into absolute knowing will be given in two parts: the unity of  being and self, and the flux of  
time with the limit of  space. 
 The identity of  being and the subject is realized in the reconciliation of  its moments. 
Hyppolite summarizes, “In [absolute knowing], the element of  existence of  the spirit is no longer 
 43. SL 59.
 44. PS ¶108.
 45. It is a helpful comparison to think of  the relation of  parent and child. The parent is the anticipated 
condition of  the child, and so the child is a being whose being involves the parent. The parent makes the child a child, 
and the parent is also only who they are by there being a child.
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the Dasein of  consciousness, but the concept, universal self-consciousness. Spirit now reflects itself  
into itself  in this element; it becomes the thought of  itself, or logos.”  The key idea for us is that 46
substance has become subject, for it is that the originally posited shape in being as alienated returns to the 
self  in its development and comes to know what has occurred. 
Hyppolite says, later on, “By recollecting the entire previous experience, we should 
rediscover these successive alienations, which not only prove that being has been resolved into self, 
but that self  has posed itself  in being.”  Alternatively, as Jon Stewart explicates, “It realizes that the 47
object sphere is not independent and autonomous but instead is necessarily connected with the 
subject and the forms of  thought.”  Being (or the objective) and the self  (or the I or the subjective) 48
are thereby understood as moments of  spirit, in such a way they are two co-instantaneous moments 
which are identical by being of  the same movement of  spirit. We had begun this paper with these 
two attempting to be equal, and only now do we know it—the equality of  truth and certainty. 
 The final step in absolute knowing is a reconciliation of  the orginary sundering that 
consciousness discovered in evaporation of  the night by the day through the overcoming of  
representational thinking by conceptual thinking. This is, however, not to say that there is no longer a 
present or past or future in the sense that the being of  past and future are one with the being of  the 
present. Rather, Hegel says, “Time is the concept itself  that is there and is represented to consciousness 
as an empty intuition.”  As Stewart summarizes: 49
The Absolute [Concept] … is a conceptual movement that transcends time: ‘Spirit 
necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time just so long as it has not grasped its 
pure [Concept], i.e. has not annulled time.’ Now, at the end of  the dialectic, 
consciousness ‘sets aside its time-form.’ Absolute knowing is an understanding not 
of  any particular historical development, but of  the necessary categorical movements 
hidden in history and religion, which is timeless.   50
Hyppolite expresses an unease around this matter, for, according to him, the unity of  the temporal 
and atemporal is the primary question of  the Phenomenology that, at the same time, lacks a clear 
solution.  He understands it as a unity of  knowledge and action, such that “in the element of  the 51
concept, this absolute knowledge appears as the very action of  the subject that thinks it … Thus 
infinite reason knows itself  in human self-consciousness and is infinite only in this finite knowledge 
 46. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 581.
 47. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 593.
 48. Jon Stewart, The Unity of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit: A Systematic Interpretation. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2000), 461.
 49. PS ¶806.
 50. Stewart, The Unity of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit, 462.
 51. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 596.
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of  itself.”  In a similar way, Bernstein understands the annulling of  time as the move from history 52
to historicity, wherein time is “who we are in our continual movement of  determination as … a 
community of  the living and the dead.”  This reconciliation of  finitude, then, completes the unity 53
of  spirit and space. As Hegel says, 
Knowing is acquainted not only with itself, but also with the negative of  itself, or its 
limit. To know its limit means to know that it is to sacrifice itself. This sacrifice is the 
relinquishing in which spirit exhibits its coming-to-be spirit in the form of  a free 
contingent event, and it intuits outside of  itself  its pure self  as time and likewise intuits its 
being as space.   54
Time as the reconciliation of  the living and the dead, i.e., the present and the past, is understood as 
the knowing and doing of  spirit that places its future as also within it. The space which is known as 
its activity has the limit as its horizon, i.e., the horizon is its historical horizon. The not Now and the 
not Here are conceptually unified with the Now and Here as a unity with difference, in what 
Bernstein calls the overcoming of  Kantian time, and is the production of  subjectivity that thereby 
facilitates the transition of  substance to subject.   55
If  we turn back to sensuous-certainty, we see that this shape produced the spatiotemporal 
subject-object ensemble, which, in absolute knowing, is taken up as the ground of  the activity of  
spirit. This activity was not so until we created spirit, as Hyppolite puts it.  It was this abstract activity 56
that through the dialectical development became aware of  what it was an abstraction of, i.e., 
consciousness came to understand how its first shape was posited by its final shape. However, it, to 
speak metaphorically, brought together the raw materials to be developed and so stays with the 
development of  consciousness as to hold these, the aforementioned ensemble, through the 
narrative. This is the bulk of  the meaning of  sensuous-certainty, but there are two other activities 
which go along with consciousness in the development, namely responsibility and memory. 
 The I, the object, time, and space occupy most of  Hegel’s time on sensuous-certainty, but in 
his reflection of  what has occurred, he reveals a possibility of  repetition within sensuous-certainty: 
It is clear both that the dialectic of  sensuous-certainty is nothing but the simple 
history of  its movement (that is, its experience) and that sensuous-certainty itself  is 
nothing but just this history. For that reason, natural consciousness also proceeds to 
this result, what is the true in sensuous-certainty, to keep pressing ever forward. It 
learns from experience about it, but then it likewise forgets it again, and then it starts 
  52. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 599.
 53. Bernstein, Lecture 30, 39:46–40:08.
 54. PS ¶807.
 55. Bernstein, Lecture 30, Part 2, 39:20–39:25.
 56. Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 598.
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the whole movement all over again right from the beginning.   57
Randall E. Auxier points out the ambiguity inherent in this statement, namely that it is not clear if  
the initiates, in regard to the practical matters, are relearning or learning for the first time.  This 58
would divide the matter of  memory into two concerns for us in regard to the consciousness which 
has overcome sensuous-certainty. Consciousness must remember the experience, and, on the other, 
must take responsibility for said experience. The essence of  its experience was in the third act, and it 
was here where sublation was first experienced as sublation. The pointing was a primal expression 
of  responsibility and memory that enabled the recognition of  sublation, for it was only in the 
capacity to point and to actually point that consciousness experienced what it did. Forgetting, 
therefore, is a returning to the beginning, i.e., a return to pure being, but we can understand it also as 
a forgetting of  sublation, or the united negativity of  being. Thus, at the heart of  the dialectic of  
sensuous-certainty, there is an orginary act of  binding together of  the parts that participated out of  
the sensuous soul, and it is only through memory and responsibility that the negative unity can be 
known. 
VI. Conclusion 
Looking back on the whole of  what has been examined in this, from initial conceptions to 
linking absolute knowing and sensuous-certainty, the meaning of  sensuous-certainty as the 
beginning of  Hegel’s Phenomenology of  Spirit has been explicated. Sensuous-certainty is essentially a 
disavowal of  mediation, which, in the affirmation of  mediation in its sublation, results in a drawing 
forth of  and holding onto its results. The sublation is an affirmation, in the sense of  remembering 
and holding true to the memory of  what was disavowed, i.e., an affirmation of  the spatiotemporal 
subject-object ensemble, which is reconciled in the creation of  spirit as the theater of  its activity. 
The abdication of  this results in the necessary repetition of  the dialectic of  sensuous-certainty, and 
so this responsibility, and capacity to remember, is needed to hold true to the result of  the 
experience it has undergone. This holding onto negativity, though consciousness does not 
immediately understand, is what it means to begin with sensuous- certainty.  
 57. PS ¶109.
 58. Randall E. Auxier, “The Return of  the Initiate: Hegel on Bread and Wine.” Owl of  Minerva,  vol. 22, no. 2 
(1991): 195, https://doi.org/10.5840/owl199122220.
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